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I
t is a pleasure and indeed an honor to be with you this evening. I must
confess that when I recall the long line of distinguished economists who
have delivered the Sandridge lecture, I wonder whether I am really worthy
of this opportunity. But in any case I am grateful for it and will strive to make
the most of it.
I have worked at the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond for just about a
quarter of a century, and for virtually all of that time I have been involved in
one way or another in the formation of monetary policy. For most of that period
I was an advisor to the president of the Richmond Fed, and for the last two
years I have served as president myself. Given this background, I believe the
most useful thing I can probably do this evening is to make a few remarks about
monetary policy and some of the major issues the Fed is facing in conducting
policy currently, in the context of my experience with the policymaking process
over the years.
The last 25 years have been extraordinarily eventful ones for monetary
policy in many ways. In this period there were fundamental changes in attitudes
among policymakers, ﬁnancial market participants, and the public regarding the
appropriate role of monetary policy and also about some of the procedures used
by the Fed in implementing policy decisions. The major factor triggering this
reevaluation without any doubt was the inﬂation that began at the end of the
1960s and peaked at about 13 percent at the beginning of the 1980s. This rise
in inﬂation was unprecedented in recent peacetime American history; it was
largely unexpected by the public and the Fed; and it severely challenged widely
held assumptions about the economy and inﬂation prevailing at the time.
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The inﬂation in the 1970s was followed by a severe recession in the early
1980s and, subsequently, a sharp deceleration in the rate of inﬂation to approx-
imately 4 to 5 percent. Most recently, as you know, inﬂation has been running
at about a 3 percent rate, which is the lowest rate since I began my career at the
Fed. If the 1970s taught us the necessity of containing inﬂation, I would say
that the major lesson of the 1980s was the importance of (1) having a long-run
strategy to achieve that goal and (2) maintaining the public’s conﬁdence in that
strategy or, to use the currently popular jargon, maintaining the credibility of
the strategy.
Tonight I want to look back over my years at the Fed, explain to you
how developments over this period have inﬂuenced thinking about monetary
policy and how it should be conducted, and share some of my own views with
you. My purpose is not so much to convince you of the wisdom of my views,
although I certainly hope you ﬁnd at least some of them persuasive, but to give
you perhaps a fuller appreciation of the fundamental issues facing monetary
policy today.
1. THE ORIGIN OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE
AND ITS MANDATE
Let me begin with just a few introductory comments about the Fed. Most if
not all of you are probably familiar with the Fed; nonetheless, a brief review
may increase your appreciation of some of the points I will be making.
The Federal Reserve was established by Congress in 1914. Initially, the
Fed’s main purpose or “mandate” was to cushion short-term interest rates from
liquidity disturbances arising from banking panics or from seasonal changes in
the demand for credit. In later years, however, the Fed’s mandate was broadened
to include a wide range of macroeconomic goals. Currently, Section 2A of the
Federal Reserve Act instructs the Fed to “maintain long-run growth of the
monetary aggregates commensurate with the economy’s long-run potential to
increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum em-
ployment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.” Moreover, in
carrying out monetary policy, the Fed is to “[take] account of past and prospec-
tive developments in employment, unemployment, production, investment, real
income, productivity, international trade and payments, and prices.”
The Fed has a measure of independence within the government in that
it makes its month-to-month policy decisions without the direct involvement
of Congress, but it is fully accountable to Congress. Accordingly, the Fed
reports formally to Congress on monetary policy every six months, and the
chairman of the Fed’s Board of Governors and other System ofﬁcials testify
before congressional committees on monetary policy issues as well as other
matters throughout the year. The body within the Fed that actually formulates
and carries out monetary policy is called the Federal Open Market Committee.     
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It is made up of the seven members of the Board of Governors located in
Washington and, at any particular time, ﬁve of the twelve regional Federal
Reserve Bank presidents. I am a voting member of this committee every third
year. I voted last year and will vote again in 1997.
A ﬁnal point I would make is that the Fed’s policy instrument—the partic-
ular variable it controls on a week-to-week basis to achieve its ultimate policy
objectives—is the interest rate on reserves that private banks lend to one an-
other, generally referred to in ﬁnancial markets as the “federal funds rate.”
Changes in this rate trigger adjustments in other interest rates, in money and
credit ﬂows, and ultimately in broad macroeconomic variables—particularly
the aggregate level of prices in the economy.
So the key points about the Fed are (1) that it is a creature of Congress,
which has ultimate authority over it; (2) that, as such, it receives its “mandate”
from Congress, regarding what it should try to achieve with monetary policy;
(3) that the policymaking Federal Open Market Committee has some degree
of independence in making its short-run policy decisions, although over time
these decisions are subject to congressional review; and (4) that the Fed’s policy
instrument is the federal funds rate.
2. PREVAILING VIEWS REGARDING MONETARY
POLICY IN THE 1960S
With these points about the Fed in mind, let me review policy over the last 25
years, obviously in a very summary fashion. When I began my career at the Fed
in 1970, there were three widely held views about the economy that strongly
inﬂuenced monetary policy and the procedures used to implement it. First,
most economists believed that there was a Phillips Curve trade-off between
unemployment and inﬂation in the long run as well as the short run. As you all
know, this famous curve summarizes the inverse empirical correlation between
unemployment and inﬂation especially evident in the 1950s and 1960s. The
implication for monetary policy, in the eyes of many, was that the Fed could
exploit the trade-off the curve seemed to indicate: that is, it could seek a lower
level of inﬂation at the cost of higher unemployment; conversely—and perhaps
more to the point—it could seek lower unemployment at the cost of higher
inﬂation.
The second widely held assumption was that economists knew enough
about the structure of the economy and the way businesses and consumers
behave to permit the Fed to make policy decisions that would eliminate, or
at least greatly diminish, the amplitudes of business cycles. This conﬁdence
had been fostered by the relatively steady economic growth that had character-
ized the 1960s and by the neo-Keynesian macroeconomic theories dominant at
the time.     
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The third important idea commonly held in the 1960s was that the welfare
costs of inﬂation were small and that, in any case, they were pretty much limited
to the “shoe-leather costs” associated with economizing on money balances in
moderately inﬂationary periods. Of course, there had not been much inﬂation
since the Korean War in the early 1950s, so this belief that inﬂation was a
relatively benign phenomenon probably reﬂected the absence of any signiﬁcant
recent experience with inﬂation.
3. INFLATION IN THE 1970S AND ITS EFFECTS
Each of these three views fell victim—largely, if not completely—to develop-
ments in the 1970s. During this period there were three major cycles of rising
inﬂation, each more severe than the one before. Each of these accelerations of
inﬂation, in turn, was followed by a sharp tightening in monetary policy and a
recession. The most memorable episode occurred in 1979 and 1980, when the
Consumer Price Index rose at an annual rate exceeding 12 percent. Confronted
with this situation, the Fed took actions that raised short-term interest rates to
unprecedented levels, and the worst recession in the postwar period followed,
lasting fully six quarters between mid-1981 and the end of 1982.
Sharp increases in oil prices in the mid- and late 1970s no doubt contributed
to inﬂation, but in the long run we know that monetary policy determines the
rate of inﬂation; consequently, inﬂation could not have risen so sharply over
this period without the Fed’s acquiescence. There are a number of explanations
for the Fed’s loss of control over inﬂation in this period, but in retrospect the
breakdown is not terribly surprising. If one combines the notions (1) that the
Fed can trade off higher inﬂation for lower unemployment, (2) that the costs
of inﬂation are small and, moreover, (3) that the Fed has sufﬁcient knowledge
about the economy’s structure to ﬁne-tune economic activity, it is not difﬁcult
to see how the Fed could be led to make monetary policy decisions that had
an inﬂationary bias.
In any case, our experience in the 1970s had a profound impact on conven-
tional thinking about inﬂation and monetary policy. Most obviously it provided
much new data that was, to put it mildly, inconsistent with the Phillips Curve
relationship observed in the 1960s. It was in the 1970s, of course, that the term
“stagﬂation” arose to describe a combination of high inﬂation and low growth.
In recent years substantial research has been done on the long-run relationship
between growth and inﬂation—much of it based on cross-country data—and I
think it is fair to say that on balance there is no compelling evidence that higher
inﬂation is associated with higher growth. Indeed, the research suggests that
the relationship may be inverse. The implication, of course, is that inﬂationary
monetary policy is not conducive to economic growth; indeed, the opposite
may be true.    
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The 1970s inﬂation also made people realize that the costs of inﬂation are
much greater and more varied than had been thought earlier. We now under-
stand much better than we did before that inﬂation creates arbitrary and unfair
redistributions of income and wealth that cause social tensions and weaken the
fabric of society. Inﬂation also distorts the signals that prices send in our market
economy, which produces serious inefﬁciencies in the allocation of resources
and reduces economic growth. Further, inﬂation needlessly causes people to
spend additional time and energy managing their personal ﬁnances. Finally,
the 1970s experience illustrated all too well that the public distress caused by
rising inﬂation is inevitably followed by corrective monetary policy actions that
depress economic activity, often—as in the early 1980s—severely.
The third consequence of our experience with inﬂation in the 1970s was a
healthy diminution in our conﬁdence that we knew enough about the structure
of the economy and the way it functions to ﬁne-tune economic activity and
eliminate recessions. As you know, this diminished conﬁdence in our ability
to guide economic activity has been mirrored by important developments in
monetary theory over the last two decades. I cannot review these developments
here in any detail, but most monetary economists now believe that the economy
will inevitably be buffeted by various unexpected “shocks” from a variety of
directions—such as the energy sector or the stock market—and that it simply
is not feasible, and probably not desirable, for the Fed to try systematically to
offset the effects of these shocks on the economy. Indeed, we have to be very
careful that our efforts to cushion the effects of such shocks do not create rising
inﬂation and thereby exacerbate the economy’s problems. As in the practice of
medicine, our ﬁrst responsibility is to do no harm.
I hasten to add that this recognition of the limitations of monetary policy
does not relieve the Fed from making short-run policy decisions. And inevitably
these decisions will be affected by current developments in the economy. My
main point here is that we now realize that these short-run decisions must
be consistent with a feasible and credible longer-term policy strategy and that
we should not compromise this strategy in a futile attempt to ﬁne-tune the
economy.
4. THE IMPACT OF THE 1970S EXPERIENCE ON
POLICY PROCEDURES
The 1970s inﬂation pointed to two fundamental weaknesses in the Fed’s overall
conduct of monetary policy—weaknesses that to some extent are still present
today. First, the System did not have a clear and unambiguous longer-run ob-
jective. As inﬂation accelerated in the mid- and late 1970s, it became apparent
that to contain inﬂation the Fed needed to set targets for some nominal variable
that it could control over time and that was clearly linked to inﬂation over time.   
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It was in this period that the Federal Open Market Committee ﬁrst began to
set numerical targets for growth rates of the money supply. Initially, the com-
mittee set short-run targets for internal use only. Subsequently, in response to a
congressional resolution in 1975, the committee began voluntarily to announce
quarterly targets for the growth rates of several deﬁnitions of the money supply.
Finally, the Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978 required the Fed to set money-
growth targets on a fourth-quarter-to-fourth-quarter basis and to present them
formally to Congress. Unfortunately, there was a major ﬂaw in the targeting
procedure—commonly referred to as “base drift”—which in fact remains to
this day. Base drift occurs because the base level of the money supply used
in calculating each new annual target is not the target level set for the fourth
quarter of the preceding year, but the actual level achieved in that period.
Therefore, target misses are forgiven when new targets are set, which allows
the base level to drift, either upward or downward. In the late 1970s persistent
upward base drift led to a prolonged period of unacceptably rapid growth in the
monetary aggregates, which in my judgment was a major factor contributing
to the subsequent double-digit inﬂation.
The second weakness in the conduct of policy highlighted by the inﬂation
of the 1970s was the tenuous link between the Fed’s month-to-month policy
decisions and the emerging longer-run money supply objectives. Under the
procedure in place through much of the decade, the Fed was supposed to
tighten policy if money growth exceeded the annual target ranges, but the re-
sponse in any instance was entirely at the Open Market Committee’s discretion
and, in practice, responses were uncertain and unpredictable. Many economists
would agree that the Fed did not react aggressively enough to the persistent
above-target growth registered in the latter years of the decade. To deal with
this problem, in October 1979 the Fed instituted a new, so-called nonborrowed
reserve operating procedure. This procedure was quite complicated in its actual
implementation, and I will not try to explain it in any detail tonight. Sufﬁce
it to say that the innovation was a monetary policy milestone because for the
ﬁrst time in the Fed’s history, its operating procedure caused short-term interest
rates to rise automatically in response to excessive money growth.
The nonborrowed reserve procedure was abandoned in October 1982,
mainly because of increasingly signiﬁcant practical problems in deﬁning the
money supply accurately in a period of rapid technological and institutional
change and ﬁnancial innovation—a problem that has continued to this day.
Since then, month-to-month operating decisions have become once again en-
tirely discretionary. I am uncomfortable with this procedure, needless to say,
and I will return to this point in a few minutes.         
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5. DISINFLATION IN THE 1980S:
THE IMPORTANCE OF CREDIBILITY
The prolonged recession in the early 1980s was followed by a pronounced
disinﬂation, and by the end of 1983 the inﬂation rate had fallen to approxi-
mately 4 percent, where it remained for the next ten years. In recent years the
rate has fallen further to approximately 3 percent. Against the background of
these developments, one can say that the decade of the 1980s was a relatively
tranquil period for monetary policy—certainly by comparison to the preceding
decade. But the more recent period was not without its own lessons for policy.
If the 1970s taught the Fed that the costs of inﬂation are signiﬁcant and that it
must commit itself clearly and fully to a low-inﬂation policy, the years since
have underlined the necessity of maintaining the credibility of this policy—by
which I mean maintaining the public’s conﬁdence that controlling inﬂation is
not a sometime thing but a permanent feature of the Fed’s overall longer-term
monetary strategy.
We now understand more clearly than before the vital role credibility plays
in minimizing the cost of reducing inﬂation and eventually stabilizing the price
level. In practical terms, maintaining credibility means the Fed must react
promptly to rising inﬂation expectations. If the Fed’s policy actions suggest
an indifference to higher expected inﬂation, the public will lose conﬁdence
in its strategy, and workers and ﬁrms will demand higher wages and charge
higher prices in a perfectly natural effort to protect wages and proﬁts from
inﬂationary erosion. The longer the Fed waits to respond to deteriorating inﬂa-
tion expectations, the more likely it will need eventually to raise real short-term
interest rates sharply with potentially depressing effects on business activity. In
a nutshell, low credibility makes it more costly from an economic perspective
to pursue an anti-inﬂation strategy.
A few years ago one of my colleagues at the Richmond Fed, Marvin
Goodfriend, wrote a widely read article1 in which he referred to episodes of
sharply rising inﬂation expectations as “inﬂation scares,” and use of that term
has now become rather general. Inﬂation scares can be captured by a variety of
ﬁnancial market indicators, but in my view the most reliable is the long-term
bond rate, and this is the indicator I watch most closely to gauge the credibility
of our anti-inﬂation strategy. A sharp rise in long-term rates—as occurred, for
example, in the ﬁrst half of 1994—is a strong signal that inﬂation expectations
have risen and the credibility of our policy has declined, and it is a sign that
demands a response from the Fed. The Fed has, in fact, reacted to inﬂation
scares more promptly in recent years than earlier, and I believe that this has
been one of the hallmarks of recent monetary policy.
1 Marvin Goodfriend, “Interest Rate Policy and the Inﬂation Scare Problem: 1979–1992,”
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly, vol. 79 (Winter 1993), pp. 1–24.   
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6. PRINCIPLES FOR MONETARY POLICY
This completes my review of monetary policy over the last quarter century. I
hope it has helped you appreciate why I believe so strongly that the Fed can
make its maximum contribution to the economy’s growth and productivity by
providing a stable price environment in which private individuals, households,
and business ﬁrms can thrive. For me, the broadest lesson of our experience
in the seventies and the eighties is that the overriding goal of monetary policy
should be the elimination of inﬂation, and by that I mean achieving a condition
where changes in the general price level are no longer a signiﬁcant factor in
the economic decisions of individuals and businesses.
In this regard, it seems clear that we should not be satisﬁed with the current
3 to 4 percent inﬂation rate. One frequently hears the argument that the beneﬁts
of achieving price-level stability do not justify the costs. I disagree strongly
with this assertion, because I do not believe thata3t o4percent inﬂation rate
could ever be a credible monetary policy objective in the way that price-level
stability could. A Fed commitment to aim for 3 or 4 percent inﬂation—despite
its relatively moderate level by recent historical standards—would lack cred-
ibility because ﬁnancial markets and the public quite understandably would
fear that eventually the Fed would tolerate higher inﬂation to achieve some
short-term objective. In technical terms, the “time inconsistency” problem in
conducting monetary policy, which is one of the most important elements in
the recent professional literature on policy, would be much more compelling in
a policy regime witha3t o4percent inﬂation objective than in a regime ﬁrmly
committed to price stability. This suspicion, in turn, would create uncertainty
regarding future inﬂation, and the attendant increase in risk obviously could
harm the economy in a variety of ways.
So my ﬁrst core belief about monetary policy is that the Fed should re-
main committed to a policy of eventually achieving true price-level stability and
strengthen that commitment in any way it can. My second core belief is that the
System needs to maintain the credibility of this policy, which implies—among
other things—that its policy procedures and short-run policy actions must be
consistent, to the greatest extent possible, with its long-term price stability ob-
jective. (I will make some speciﬁc points in this regard in a minute.) As I have
already noted, by maintaining credibility the Fed can make its anti-inﬂationary
strategy less costly in the transition to price stability and therefore more likely
to be successful.
If I have been persuasive this evening, you may think that the two monetary
policy principles I have put forward—a policy of price stability and mainte-
nance of the credibility of that policy—are obvious and that there is little left
to say. Unfortunately, we still have a substantial distance to go in putting these
principles fully into practice. To see that our price stability objective lacks full
credibility, one has only to open the newspaper and look at the current level   
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of the long-term U.S. Treasury bond rate, which is still well over 7 percent.
Since it is doubtful that real long-term bond rates ever rise above 4 percent,
this means that market participants, on average, currently expect a long-run
inﬂation rate of at least 3 percent.
What are the reasons for this lack of credibility? I think there are a number,
and I would like to close my remarks tonight by identifying some of them and
sharing some ideas about what might be done to deal with them.
As I have indicated before, I believe the most pressing problem the Fed
faces in conducting monetary policy currently is the lack of a clear policy man-
date from Congress. As I explained earlier, the current mandate contained in the
1978 Humphrey-Hawkins law makes the Fed responsible for a laundry list of
economic outcomes having to do with employment, productivity, international
trade, and so forth, in addition to the price level. A revised mandate instructing
the Fed to focus squarely on achieving price stability almost certainly would
enhance the contribution of monetary policy to the nation’s long-run economic
growth and productivity—indeed, because it would do so, it would increase, not
reduce, the likelihood that the laudable objectives of the Humphrey-Hawkins
law will be achieved.
Five years ago Congressman Steve Neal of North Carolina introduced in
Congress an amendment to the Federal Reserve Act proposing just such a man-
date. This resolution would have instructed the Federal Open Market Committee
to pursue a policy strategy that would “reduce inﬂation gradually in order to
eliminate inﬂation by not later than 5 years from the date of enactment of
[the] legislation and [to] then adopt and pursue monetary policies to maintain
price stability.” We at the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond wholeheartedly
supported the Neal amendment, as did many others in the Federal Reserve
System, as an operationally feasible means of increasing the credibility of the
Fed’s anti-inﬂationary strategy. Unfortunately, the amendment did not pass.
Since Congress has not seen ﬁt to pass the amendment, my personal view—
and I need to emphasize here that I am speaking strictly for myself—is that the
Fed should explicitly and publicly announce that it is adopting the language of
the amendment as its longer-term strategic policy goal. In my judgment this
step would put the Fed’s reputation clearly on the line, which would directly
increase the credibility of our strategy. Moreover, as I have already suggested,
such a step would be fully consistent with the present Humphrey-Hawkins
mandate since price stability would permit the economy to achieve maximum
growth in output and employment over time. In this regard, I might note that the
value of price stability as a primary monetary policy objective is increasingly
recognized around the world. In recent years the central banks in Canada, New
Zealand, and the United Kingdom have actually speciﬁed explicit numerical
inﬂation targets. Since the Neal amendment does not specify numerical tar-
gets, its adoption by the Fed would be a step short of these actions abroad.
Nonetheless, the amendment’s language is sufﬁciently clear to commit the Fed  
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ﬁrmly to attaining price stability in a speciﬁc time frame and hence contains
all the ingredients necessary to enhance the System’s credibility. Moreover—
and this is an especially important point—adoption of the amendment language
as its long-term objective would increase the Fed’s ﬂexibility in dealing with
short-term economic disturbances since appropriate short-term actions could be
taken without (or with much less) concern about the potential loss of long-term
credibility.
A second area requiring attention is our operating procedures. As I men-
tioned in my earlier historical review, only in the three-year period from October
1979 to October 1982 has the Fed used an operating procedure that automat-
ically linked movements in our policy instrument—namely the federal funds
rate—to a longer-term policy goal, in this case growth rates of the monetary
aggregates. As I noted earlier, that procedure was abandoned, largely because
of the technical difﬁculties that arose in deﬁning an operationally reliable mea-
sure of the money supply in a period of rapid technological and institutional
change—difﬁculties that unfortunately still confront us. Currently, we still set
annual targets for the money supply, but these targets have little effect on our
month-to-month policy decisions, which are made pretty much in the same
discretionary fashion that characterized the pre-1979 period. This is another
important reason why, in my judgment, our credibility is not as full as it could
be and should be.
What the Fed needs, in my view, is an operating procedure that clearly
links our short-run policy actions directly to our longer-run inﬂation goals
or to some other nominal variable such as nominal gross domestic product.
Regrettably, at this point no such procedure exists that commands sufﬁcient
conﬁdence to be used in practice. Many economists both inside and outside
the Fed are working actively on this problem, however, and I have conﬁdence
that somewhere down the road we will come up with an acceptable operat-
ing procedure that more systematically and efﬁciently links our instrument to
our goals. In the meantime, the Fed must retain the independence to take the
short-run policy actions that it believes are most likely to be consistent with
its long-run objectives—recognizing, of course, that it is responsible for and
accountable for the consequences of these decisions.
A ﬁnal and very important point I would make is that the Fed has a strong
obligation to educate the public about the cost of inﬂation and the limitations
of activist short-term monetary policies. In my review, I explained how the
inﬂation of the 1970s led me and many others to conclude that some of the
views regarding inﬂation and monetary policy in the 1960s were not valid.
Unfortunately, in my opinion, many people still believe that a long-run as well
as a short-run trade-off between inﬂation and unemployment exists, that the
costs of inﬂation are small, and that the Fed can ﬁne-tune economic activity.
The persistence of these views—particularly when they are held by people
with political power—naturally diminishes the credibility of our anti-inﬂation  
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strategy, especially given that our mandate is so imprecise. It would be a tragedy
if the lessons of the last 25 years were forgotten and the nation needlessly
experienced another devastating boom-bust cycle like the one in the 1979–82
period. So I think we in the Fed have an obligation to speak out on these issues.
My remarks here tonight have been an effort in that direction, and I hope that
I have added at least a bit to your appreciation of some of the fundamental
issues facing monetary policymakers today.